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1. Introduction
Sports fans perceive the salaries of professionals in popular team sports as being
enormous, and especially in Europe the salaries are subject to public discussion usually
questioning whether players really deserve the sums they earn. In European soccer this
discussion about the players´ salaries was recently stimulated again, since the clubs
cannot sell the broadcasting rights as expensive as in previous years.
2 Therefore, they
are not able to keep paying high salaries. The clubs try to react to the new situation in
different ways. Most of the clubs reduce the number of players on their pay roll by not
renewing expiring contracts. Some clubs also try to cut short on the salaries of the
remaining players by increasing the variable part of the players´ salaries, which is
connected to the sportive success of the club while decreasing the fixed wage.
3 So the
variable part of the salary becomes more important. However, when looking at incentive
clauses in German soccer we discovered that the incentive structure is rather simple and
unindividualistic. They do not seem to follow the basic ideas of principal-agent theory.
Even more surprising was that contracts in professional US team sports, especially the
NFL and NBA, use entirely different clauses to set incentives.
In this paper we look at the variable payments more closely. The question is: What are
players in team sports paid for? What are the incentives that make them run, score,
defend and finally win?
4 And why are incentive clauses set differently in different types
of team sports?
                                                       
2 The revenues from selling broadcasting rights are the clubs’ major source of income.
3 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ); July 15, 2002.
4 It is often argued that players prefer performing in games, i.e. players have an intrinsic motivation
(Baker, 2000b). However, this assumption runs counter to all common models of labor market theory, in
which it is inferred that putting forth effort imposes disutility on the agent. Although often players
complain publicly about not being nominated by the coach the underlying reason is rather the
maximization of future income streams than the mere desire to play. So we will leave this argument aside.
2 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2002,  Paper 17
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2002/iss1/art17version18_11;Erstelldatum 18.11.02 01:32 3
We start by giving a short overview of the relevant principal-agent literature and apply
it to the management-player relationship in team sports (2). In the second chapter the
incentive systems of existing contracts are illustrated. We look at contracts in German
professional soccer (DFL) and at the clauses used in US sports, especially basketball
(NBA) and football (NFL)
5 and compare the incentives provided (3). In the third
chapter we assess the incentives used in Europe and the US with regards to the
theoretical perspective of the principal-agent literature, including some more recently
made arguments about the use of subjective and objective performance measures (4),
before drawing some conclusions (5).
2. A principal-agent perspective to team sports
In this chapter we start with a short overview of the principal-agent theory (2.1).
6 In the
second part of the chapter the focus is on the principal-agent relationship between
management and players in team sports. We will point out the distinctive features of the
team sports industry compared to other industries (2.2).
2.1 The principal-agent theory: a short overview
Principal-agent relationships arise, whenever one person engages another person to
perform some service on his behalf. The hiring person gets dependent on the other’s
action. The dependent person is called principal, the person taking the action on behalf
                                                       
5 Deutsche Fussball-Liga (German Soccer League) (DFL), National Basketball Association (NBA),
National Football League (NFL).
6 Since the principal-agent literature is extensive, this overview only considers the parts that will be
relevant for the further discussion. For a more comprehensive overview see e.g. Stiglitz (1998).
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of the other is called agent.
7 Agency-theory makes two basic assumptions about the
actors:
§ The principal as well as the agent are self-interested, utility-maximizing actors.
§ Furthermore the agent is risk-avers, while the principal is risk-neutral or at least less
risk-avers than the agent.
8
Since it is obvious that an utility-maximizing agent does not necessarily act entirely in
the principal’s interest, normative agency-theory
9 makes proposals how the agency-
problem can be solved: The question that normative agency-theory tries to answer is,
how contracts have to be designed to provide the agent with incentives that make him
act in the best interest of the principal.
Usually the output of the agent’s action, i.e. the principal’s revenue, is positively
correlated with the effort the agent puts forth. However, the output generally is not only
a function of the agent’s effort but also of other variables influencing the outcome in
either a positive or a negative way.
10 These exogenous effects cannot be controlled by
the agent.
The first-best solution for the principal to induce the optimal level of effort is to base
the salary directly on the agent’s effort. The principal knows the amount of effort which
maximizes his own revenue and sets a wage function accordingly, so that the agent
self-interestedly chooses the optimal effort.
11 Payment by effort is the first-best
                                                       
7 See Pratt and Zeckhauser (1985).
8 See e.g. Gibbons (1998).
9 The distinction between normative and positive agency theory is drawn by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
10 See Arrow (1985).
11 Of course the principal only offers a contract, when the expected profit from hiring an agent is higher
than performing the task himself. The agent accepts the contract if his participation constraint is fulfilled.
When putting forth the ex ante determined effort the agent receives the agreed upon wage. If he signs the
contract, but does not fulfill his specified duties he does not receive money and might be penalized. The
agent only puts forth the required effort if his incentive-compatibility constraint is fulfilled.
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incentive contract, the outcome is socially optimal. However, paying according to effort
requires, that the principal can monitor the agent perfectly and cheaply. If such
monitoring is possible the principal-agent relationship is unproblematic.
The assumption that the principal can monitor the agent perfectly, is very strong.
Usually there are information asymmetries between the principal and the agent after
signing the contract, for two reasons:
12
§ The agent has better knowledge about the decisions he is taking on behalf of the
principal (hidden information).
§ The principal is not able to observe exactly how much effort the agent really puts
forth, because monitoring is costly and precise measures of the agent’s behavior are
not available, i.e. only the agent himself knows if he acted in the best interest of the
principal and how much effort he put forth (hidden action).
Therefore the agent can act against the interest of the principal, e.g. he can put forth low
effort without the principal being able to detect it.
13
Given asymmetric information the principal can no longer base his payments on the
agent’s effort. The best thing the principal can do under these circumstances is using the
output as an estimator for the agent’s effort. However, the greater the influence of the
above mentioned exogenous variables on the output the weaker the correlation between
the agent’s effort and his output. Being paid according to an estimator, which he can not
fully control, exposes the agent to risk.
14 Since he is risk-avers he has to be
compensated by a risk-premium. Shifting risk from the principal to the agent causes a
                                                       
12 See Richter and Furubotn (1999), p.163.
13 The possibility of moral hazard causes agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs
as the sum of monitoring expenditures by the principal, bonding expenditures of the agent and the
residual loss.
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loss from inefficient risk-sharing
15 and is, therefore, not socially optimal. Hence any
contractual solution not directly based on effort has to deal with a tradeoff between the
benefits from setting incentives for the agent and the costs of exposing him to risk.
2.2 Principals and agents in team sports
In this paper we analyze the relation between the management (principal) and the
players (agents). This relationship is different from the employer-employee relationship
in other industries. We illustrated that paying according to effort very often is
impossible since there are ex post asymmetric information. In the team sports industry
these information asymmetries hardly exist because it is easier and less costly to
observe players´ efforts.
16
The effort agents in team sports are required to put forth is their performance in training
and in games. Training as well as the games themselves are monitored by the principal,
i.e. the management, and the coaches.
17 The effort of an individual player cannot only
be observed by the principal, but it is also monitored and evaluated by the public and
the press. Therefore, the public and the press can be regarded as an objective third party
observer. Given the assumption that the effort of players in team sports can be observed
easily and cheaply it should be expected that the bonus payments are directly based on
the player’s effort. Individual effort particularly should be expected to be used as basis
for variable payments, because the quality of the team output as an estimator for
individual effort is diluted by strong exogenous effects. Two exogenous effects are
                                                                                                                                                                  
14 See Milgrom and Roberts (1992), p.207.
15 Given the assumption that the principal is risk-neutral or at least less risk averse than the agent.
16 This is also claimed by Lehmann and Weigand (1999).
17 In this paper we do not consider the agency-problems between the management and the coach.
Coaches are employees of the club, too, and, as such, not part of the management although they decide
who participates in a game. But coaches neither have any type of contract with the players nor do they
pay or decide about the players’ salaries.
6 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2002,  Paper 17
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2002/iss1/art17version18_11;Erstelldatum 18.11.02 01:32 7
especially strong in team sports: Firstly, each player is strongly dependent on the
performance of his teammates.
18 Secondly, the output is strongly dependent on the
relative strength of the opposing team. Additionally, there are further variables like the
weather and the condition of the pitch that influence the outcome of the game. So the
result of the game is only weakly correlated with the player’s effort and bonus payments
based on results of games can only provide inefficient incentives.
In the next part we will analyze the incentive clauses written in existing contracts to see
what type of performance such contracts aim for and how they differ depending on the
type of sports.
3. Incentive clauses used in actual sports contracts
19
In this chapter we look at contracts between the management and the players in
professional German soccer and in US sports
20. We concentrate on the variable parts of
the salaries and discuss the incentive effects.
21 We start by looking at contracts in
German soccer (3.1). Afterwards we analyze contracts used in the NFL and the NBA
(3.2). In both parts we do not only look at the contracts but also provide an overview of
the distinct governance structures and their impacts on the respective labor markets. In
                                                       
18 This is especially true when competitiveness in team sports increases and the gap between good and
bad teams gets smaller. There might be very few exemptions like Michael Jordan in basketball, Pele in
soccer, and Joe Montana in football. But they also were dependent on good team members like Scottie
Pippen, Garrincha and Jerry Rice respectively.
19 Most of the information presented here was given by clubs, agents or the League itself.
20 The four major sports are basketball, football, baseball and ice hockey. Here we concentrate on
professional football (NFL) and basketball (NBA) in the US as the information for those sports is most
easily accessible. It should be noted that the incentive clauses used in the NHL and MLB differ,
sometimes significantly, from the ones used in the NFL or NBA, e.g. MLB does not allow performance
bonuses based on statistical achievements.
21 It should be noted that incentives are always set with regards to the number of wins. The underlying
assumption for this is that business and sporting success are strongly correlated in the long run, i.e.
winning more games increases profits. This relation is certainly not total and clear-cut. Profits are by far
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the third part of this chapter we shortly summarize our findings, comparing German
soccer and US sports (3.3).
3.1 Incentive clauses in professional German soccer
The general situation in German soccer can be summarized as follows. In the first place,
there is no labor union or other collective bargaining units with power comparable to
the Players Associations in the NBA or NFL.
22 There is also no compulsory standard
contract. None of the European soccer leagues limits individual salaries of the players or
the sum of salaries of a team.
23 Players and clubs enjoy freedom of contract to a large
extent.
24 Thus, the precise conditions of the contract depend on the bargaining power of
the player and the management.
25
Incentives in soccer contracts are similar for all players and only vary with the amount
at stake.
26 The salary of a player usually consists of the following components:
 27
§ a fixed monthly (gross) salary,
                                                                                                                                                                  
not solely dependent on a team winning (see Downward and Dawson (2000, pp.67) and Hoehn and
Szymanski (1999)).
22 There is a labor union in soccer called FIFPro. It is operating world wide but has no bargaining power.
The regulative framework is set by a hierarchy of associations: FIFA – world-wide; UEFA – in Europe;
DFB/DFL – on a national level. They not only set the rules of the game but also provide a governance
structure for the business, e.g. see Satzung Die Liga – Fussballverband e.V. (Ligaverband), DFL –
Lizenzordnung Spieler (LOS).
23 The idea of a salary cap was discussed in Germany during the 2001/2002 season as salaries were rising
fast and the managers worried because the price for the sale of broadcasting rights seemed to have
reached an upper limit (Koelner Stadtanzeiger; December 28, 2001).
24 Due to the repetitive nature of contracting in team sports, both, players and clubs, have individualized
standard contracts.
25 There are, however, labor regulations that control the transfer of players which could affect the
bargaining power and, hence, the salary of a player. These limitations can be classified as severely as far
as they reduce the possibility of an early termination of a contract, considerable regarding the transfers of
non-EU players and, since the Bosman Case [ECJ (C-415/93)] and the changes following it, almost non-
existing for the rest of the transfers.
26 It should be noted that the contracts suggested by the DFB (Deutscher Fußball Bund), which were valid
until 2000, only named a monthly base salary and profit-sharing bonuses as remuneration of the player in
Paragraph 5. Incentives or performance based payments are not mentioned at all.
27 The variable parts can add up to a considerable share of the total salary, i.e. around 50% (see
www.spiegel.de/spiegel/0,1518,druck-192806,00.html (April 30, 2002). There seems to be a strong
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§ a payment depending on the outcome of the game,
28 and
§ an annual bonus based on participation in the games.
29
This incentive scheme relies on two main features. Firstly, paying a player according to
the result of the game, i.e. individuals are paid based on the performance of the team.
However, it does not matter if he played five minutes or the whole game. If he scored or
did a great save. For receiving this bonus is also not important how he performed and
how much effort he put forth.
Secondly, paying a player bonuses based on the number of games he participated in
regardless of the result sets incentives to put forth effort ex ante, i.e. in training.
30
In general it can be observed that there are no explicit incentive clauses directly based
on effort. The incentive clause aiming at the performance during the game is only based
on team performance and, therefore, individual effort is estimated inaccurately.
3.2 Contracts in US sports
In contrast to German soccer there are labor unions represent the supply side of the
labor market in the US in all four major sports. Collective Bargaining Agreements
(CBA), which are negotiated between the players’ union
31 and the leagues
32, regulate
almost every sporting and business aspect of the game. The main aim of the Player
                                                                                                                                                                  
tendency towards paying signing bonuses, even though this is hard to evaluate since signing bonuses are
usually not part of the contracts. See also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ); August 7, 2002.
28 As three points are awarded for a win, one for a draw and none for a loss it is usually agreed to pay an
amount per point on the basis of the position in the league, e.g. Euro 3000 per point if team is ranked 2.-5.
in the current table.
29 Usually this only includes games played as part of the ordinary league schedule, the national cup or a
European competition. Also these bonuses are only paid up to a certain limit.
30 Obviously this is based on subjective evaluation of the player’s effort. But this is an implicit agreement
and not explicitly specified in the contract. See also chapter 4.
31 National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) and National Basketball Players Association
(NBPA).
32 The NFL is represented by the Management Council. The NBA is represented by the Commissioner,
the deputy Commissioner, various owners, the NBA’s attorneys, and financial experts.
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Associations and the CBAs is to provide a general governance structure for the labor
market and to protect the players from the monopsonic exploitation of the league.
Generally, the CBAs restrict the freedom of individual contracting for players and clubs
by prescribing the mandatory use of standard contracts
33 and the amendments allowed.
34
The Commissioner has the right to veto a player’s contract in both leagues.
35 The
freedom of contract is indirectly further reduced by artificially setting boundaries to the
total amount that clubs are allowed to spend on the salaries of all players on the roster,
i.e. setting a salary cap
36, and by laying down a Minimum Team Salary
37. In addition,
the CBA influences the decision of an individual player even further and weakens his
bargaining position by imposing restrictions on the mobility of players
38 and by limiting
the choice of the first employment by holding an entry draft
39. However, in most cases
the CBA does not set strict boundaries for individual salaries,
40 i.e. the club and the
player are allowed to bargain.
41
                                                       
33 The standard contracts are called Uniform Player Contract (NBA) and NFL Player Contract (NFL).
34 See Article XIV of the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement and Article II Section 2 and 3 of NBA
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
35 See Greenberg (1993).
36 The salary cap is basically calculated as a certain percentage of gross revenue. For more details see
Article VII of NBA CBA and Article XXIV of NFL CBA. The NBA has one notable clause known as
“Bird” exemption. For a critic on the salary cap and its implications see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(FAZ); February 1, 2002.
37 See Article VII Section 2 (b) of the NBA CBA and Article XXIV Section 5 of the NFL CBA.
38 The regulations limiting the mobility of players with a valid contract are biased in favor of the clubs
who can release players much more easily than players can terminate their contract. In addition the NFL
imposes limits on the movement of a player even after his contract has expired (See Article XVI – XX of
the NFL CBA). Thus, increasing the bargaining power of a club relative to that of a player. See Article XI
of the NBA CBA and Article XIX of the NFL CBA in particular.
39 See Article XVI of the NFL CBA and Article X of the NBA CBA.
40 However, there are a couple of notable exemptions. First, the NBA Rookie Scale Contracts laid down
in Article VIII and Exhibit B of the CBA which limit the individual wage of rookies. Second, Article VII
Section 5 (c) of the NBA CBA outlines the limitations for increases or decreases of the annual salary split
in fixed salary and likely bonuses as part of the incentive compensation for all players classified in
different categories. And third, the Minimum Player Salary and Maximum Annual Salary as identified in
Article II Sections 6 and 7 respectively of the NBA CBA. The NFL only determines a Minimum Salary
(see Article XXXVIII Section 1 to 5 of the NFL CBA) and sets loose boundaries for the decrease and
increase in salary (see Article XXIV Section 8 of NFL CBA) but imposes no further restrictions on
individual salaries.
41 As the compensation agreed upon in the contract is the result of a bargaining process between the club
and the player an analysis of the structure of compensation has to consider the interests of the two parties
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A player`s wage usually consists of the three following primary components:
§ Signing bonuses are up-front payments players receive for the execution of a new
contract or the extension of the previous one. The player keeps such payments even
if the club terminates his contract before the end of the contracting period.
42 As such
it can be regarded as an insurance against unfair dismissal. Signing bonuses are
spread over the entire length of the contract for salary cap calculations
43
§ Fixed payments are usually agreed upon as an amount per season
44 and generally
count towards the salary cap
45.
§ Performance bonuses (incentives) are based on various individual and team
achievements. They can be classified in several categories, e.g. based on individual
or team performance. Consequences of reaching an agreed upon benchmark are
either an additional payment, a “rollover”
46 or the option to void one or more years
                                                                                                                                                                  
involved. The club is interested in maximizing profit. So it will try to sign those players where the
difference between the revenue it derives from such players and the salary is the largest. Having said that,
it should be noted that determining the exact revenue of a player is impossible in team sports as that
would mean calculating the additional number of spectators a player attracts. Hence, proxies are used to
estimate the marginal revenue product (Mandle, 1998). However, these hiring decision are interdependent
as the sum of the salaries is subject to salary cap regulations. The player is interested in maximizing his
utility. Hence, he tries to earn as much money as possible and at the same time minimizes effort. These
two aims are conflicting because showing effort imposes a disutility on the player and profits the club as
the winning probability is rising, hence, attracting more spectators (See footnote 20 and Quirk and Fort,
1995).
42 Such termination is possible because most contracts are not guaranteed (see
http://www.nflpa.org/PDFs/Shared/Guaranteed_Contracts.pdf; July 14, 2002) in the NFL. In the NBA
clubs can terminate the contract according to Exhibit A “National Basketball Association Uniform Player
Contract” Paragraph 16 of the CBA. This Paragraph, however, is subject to changes as laid down in
Article II Section 3 of the CBA in most players’ contracts (Roberts, 1992).
43 See Article VII Section 3 (b) of NBA CBA and Article XXIV Section 7 (b) of the NFL CBA for more
details.
44 Fixed payments are paid in accordance to the regulations laid down in Exhibit A Paragraph 3 of the
NBA CBA or Appendix C Paragraph 5 of the NFL CBA. Generally, the amounts agreed upon in
Paragraph 5 of the NFL Player Contract or in Exhibit 1 or Exhibit 1A following Paragraph 3 of the
Uniform Player Contract in the NBA count towards the salary caps.
45 See Article VII of the NBA CBA and Article XXIV Section 7 (a) of the NFL CBA.
46 When the player achieves an agreed upon benchmark his base salary is increased by the predetermined
amount for one or more years (Walanka, 1997).
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at the end of the contract.
47 For salary cap purposes bonuses are classified as “likely
to be earned” or “not likely to be earned”
48 dependent on the performance of the
player or the team during the previous season.
49 Only the former count towards the
cap.
In the following we concentrate on performance bonuses. Their influence on the
production of a player highly depends on their precise nature. The number of players
having such incentive clauses in their contracts varies with the type of sports.
3.2.1 Incentive clauses in the NFL
The NFL CBA lists a large number of incentives in Article XXIV Section 7 (c) for the
purpose of salary cap calculations but, as such, they also provide an overview of all
types of performance-based payments.
50 These bonuses can be roughly divided into
team incentives
51 and individual incentives.
52
Examples for team incentives include:
§ for the complete team: winning games, the Conference Championship, or the Super
Bowl;
                                                       
47 In the case of waving one or more years of the contract it often includes the option for the club to buy
back this time for an amount in excess of the salary previously agreed upon.
48 Article VII Section 5 (d) of the NBA CBA limits the amount earned through “unlikely bonuses” to 25%
of the player’s regular salary.
49 See Article XXIV Section 7 (c) of the NFL CBA.
50 http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/statitudes/onthemoney/news/1999/09/14/williams_contract/index.html
(July 17, 2002) and
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/nfl/news/1999/08/12/colts_edgerrin_ap/index.html (July 17,
2002) give examples of such incentive clauses referring to contracts of former New Orleans’ running
back Ricky Williams and Indianapolis’ running back Edgerrin James.
51 See Article XXIV Section 7 (c) page 107 of NFL CBA.
52 The NFL also allows for bonuses based on a combination of team and individual performance, e.g.  a
player receives a bonus of $1m if he scores 10 touchdowns and the team ends the season with more
rushing yards than the previous season.
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§ for the offence: points scored by offence, total offence (net yards), ranking based on
yards in the Conference;
§ for the defense: touchdowns allowed, sacks, average net yards given up by passing
plays, ranking in the league based on points allowed; and
§ for the special teams: own punt return average, opposite kick-off return average.
Examples for individual incentives include:
53
§ statistical accomplishments, e.g. number of touchdowns, sacks, or catches, average
yards per rush, field goal percentage, pass rating;
54
§ physical condition, e.g. staying under a certain weight limit;
§ roster
55, reporting
56, or playtime bonuses, e.g. playing more than eight games as a
starter, playing more than 40% of the offence plays;
§ achieving a certain position in a specified ranking, e.g. first in the number of passes
caught in the league; and
§ being voted by the media or the public into the Veteran/Rookie Honors or
Veteran/Rookie Media Team, e.g. Pro Bowl, MVP-NFL, NFL or Conference Player
of the Year.
57
§ In addition incentives based on subjective standards are allowed, counting 100%
towards the salary cap.
58
In the NFL about 65-75% of the players receive payments which are based on some
kind of individual accomplishments.
59 Even as such payments only account for 5% of
                                                       
53 See http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/nfl/news/1999/05/14/williams_sign/index.html for
examples.
54 In the NFL in some cases incentives are even based on the individual performance of another player
(Walanka, 1997).
55 Roster bonuses are paid for being a member of the team at a specific date.
56 Reporting bonuses are paid for attending training-camps and reporting to the club on time.
57 For a complete list see page 122 and 123 in Article XXIV Section 7 (c) of NFL CBA.
13 Heubeck and Scheuer: Incentive Contracts in Team Sports - Theory and Practice
Produced by bepress.com, 2011version18_11;Erstelldatum 18.11.02 01:32 14
the total salary of all players.
60 it should be noted that the individual contract is decisive
and not the summed up amount over all players’ contracts.
3.2.2 Incentive clauses in the NBA
In the NBA performance bonuses are less common than in the NFL. In basketball such
incentive clauses can be based on:
61
§ performance of the team at the end of season,
§ physical conditions,
§ statistical accomplishments, or
§ receiving a league-wide recognized award.
It is not allowed:
62
§ to offer bonuses for winning specific games or series of games and
§ to refer to achievements during the previous season, e.g. free throw percentage
higher than in the previous season, when setting benchmarks for the current season.
Additionally to the incentive clauses in individual contracts there is the payment of the
NBA Playoff Pool to the appropriate teams which collectively pays for team
                                                                                                                                                                  
58 See page 122 of Article XXIV Section 7 (c) Side Letter 4/27/93: Sec.12 of NFL CBA.
59 See Frick, Dilger and Prinz (2002). For more details see
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/nfl/salaries/splash.htm (July 13, 2002) which shows the distribution
between base salary and bonuses for all players individually for the NFL 2000 season.
60 According to information given by the NFL. Also see http://www.canoe.ca/Slam020627/nfl_ten-
ap.html (July 16, 2002). It is more likely for players at skill positions, e.g. quarterbacks, running backs,
wide receivers, and tight ends, to earn additional money on incentive features but there are also players at
other positions, e.g. defensive linemen, that have such clauses written in their contracts. However, the
value of a player for the team is not reflected by having incentive clauses in the contract, i.e. there are star
players who only receive a signing bonus and a fixed salary and there are journeymen who earn
performance based payments.
61 See Article II Section 3 (c) of NBA CBA.
62 See Article II Section 3 (c) of NBA CBA.
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performance. However, this only represents a small fraction of the normal salary for
each player and as such has little incentive effects.
63
3.2.3 Interim findings for the NFL and the NBA
As seen in chapter 2 principal-agent theory suggests, that efficient incentive clauses
should be conditioned on the observed effort of the players. However, explicit incentive
clauses used in contracts in the NBA and the NFL are not based on observed effort but
rather on individual or even team output.
As illustrated before, team output cannot be attributed to the effort of a single player,
but is a function of multiple variables. Therefore, the team output is only loosely
correlated with the effort of an individual player. Even individual output is only partly
correlated with the effort of the player. As mentioned before, the individual
performance of each player is strongly dependent on the performance of teammates, e.g.
the amount of passing yards a quarterback can achieve is dependent on the quality of the
receivers. This means that players can benefit from each others abilities and effort as
these are interdependent.
Even though we did not find any explicit agreements directly based on individual effort
there are some payments connected to reasonable estimators for the player’s effort
64,
thus providing individual incentives, as we will show in chapter 4. Still, the above
described explicit incentive clauses used in US sports based on individual and team
output alone do not seem to provide efficient incentives for the individual player.
65
                                                       
63 See Mandle (1998).
64 Better proxies include incentives based on the voting of the media, on statistical achievements, on
individual ranking and on playtime. Mediocre and bad proxies for individual effort include clauses
referring to roster bonuses, to reporting bonuses and to physical condition.
65 Even if it could be argued that the success of a team might be highly correlated with the effort of one
player, e.g. Michael Jordan and the Chicago Bulls, it seems to be unreasonable from a risk sharing
perspective to include such clauses in the contract of a single player. See also footnote 17.
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3.3  Comparative concluding remarks
Generally, contracts used in the NBA and NFL are more complex and more restricted
by the respective CBA than the counterparts in professional German soccer.
Looking at the contracts two things stroke us as being unusual. Firstly, the explicit
incentives clauses used do not seem to be based directly on individual effort but on
individual or team output. This contradicts the propositions of normative agency theory.
So why is it, that even though individual effort is publicly observable, it does not seem
to be used as a basis for bonus payments?
The second thing that seems odd is, that – especially in German soccer – not individual
output is used as an estimator of the effort, but team output. Why is it, that in the US at
least some estimators for individual output are used while this is not the case in German
soccer?
We will turn to these two questions in the following chapter by looking into additional
theoretical approaches to the principal agent problem.
4.  Explanations for the deviation between principal-agent theory and practice
and for the differences between the NBA, NFL and professional German soccer
The contracts of players in the NFL, the NBA and professional German soccer seem to
contradict principle-agent theory. The general idea, derived from principal-agent theory,
is to reward observed effort by setting explicit agreements in contracts if possible. None
of the incentive clauses used in actual contracts does not follow these implications as
none of the described explicit incentives seems to be based on individual effort directly.
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In the following chapter some reasons for this apparent contradiction are elaborated.
Firstly, we will elaborate on the idea that subjective performance measures and
tournaments – instead of pay-for-performance clauses - could provide efficient
incentives (4.1). The second part illustrates the problems of setting the correct
incentives by only using objective performance measures in more detail. We will
expand the analysis with some rather recent arguments about the quality of objective
performance measures concentrating on applications to contracts in team sports (4.2).
Thereby we are able to explain why incentive clauses used in US sports are different
from those used in soccer. The last part of the chapter will elaborate on the idea that a
combination of subjective and objective performance measures might provide efficient
incentives for players in team sports (4.3).
4.1  Subjective performance measures and tournaments
At first sight we could not find any explicit incentive clauses based on individual effort.
But in this part of the paper we show that the management partly induces effort by using
subjective performance measures which are not explicitly stated in the contract. The
subjective performance measures are used as a basis for tournament-style incentives.
Tournaments in various forms in which a player competes primarily against his
teammates, but also on the labor market in general, are the most important device to
influence the players’ behavior.
66
                                                       
66 Although the underlying principle of these tournaments is identical in all the analyzed sports, the
applications of the systems are somewhat different.
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4.1.1  Subjective performance measurement
Subjective performance measures have the advantage, that they allow the principal to
examine the agent`s behavior ex post, i.e. the principal can observe the actions of an
agent and then decide if the behavior of the agent was in his interest.
 67 Therefore, it is
not necessary to define the specific task ex ante.
68 A broader definition of what the
agent is supposed to do is sufficient.
69 For the principal it is easier and, hence, less
costly to evaluate the result of the agent’s action ex post. Usually subjective evaluation
is unpopular amongst supervisors and employees, because employees tend to believe
that their performance appraisal is ineffective, while the supervisors think subjective
measures generate conflicts.
70 The problem using subjective evaluation and implicit
arrangements usually is that opportunistic behavior by the management becomes more
likely as it is difficult to verify the situation to third parties.
71 Hence, the agent is
vulnerable to the discretional powers of the principal. In team sports these rejections
against subjective performance measures do not exist as coaches have to evaluate
players as part of their job anyway,
72 and players are used to public discussions about
their individual performance. Additionally, as performance is publicly observable the
media can be regarded as third party enforcement.
                                                       
67 ”Subjectivity allows the supervisors to examine, ex post, the actions that an employee took and decide
whether it represented dysfunctional behavior or gaming. It also allows the supervisors to subjectively
“back out“ noise in an objective performance measure, reducing the riskiness of a measure without
adding distortion“ (Baker, 2000b).
68 Due to the complexity in the interaction of team members, coaches and the management and the variety
of on- and off-field tasks such an ex ante specification would be extremely costly and probably even
impossible in team sports.
69 A narrow definition would also include the rewards and punishments conditioned on the outcomes.
This can be very costly as the agents have „superior specific knowledge about the job they are doing“
(Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988).
70 See Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988). The tendency “to establish simple, quantifiable standards
against which to measure and reward performance” is also mentioned by Kerr (1975).
71 For a more detailed elaboration see Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988).
72 As coaches are usually fired first when a team is unsuccessful their motivation to supervise and
sanction is clear.
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In team sports implicit agreements based on subjective performance measures induce
tournament competition between the players, as we will see in the next part.
4.1.2  Tournaments
73
Both, in German soccer and US sports, tournament-style competition is used to trigger
individual effort of the players. Such an incentive system is based on subjective
performance measures evaluated by the coaches and the management.
In soccer, tournaments take place when players fight for the spots on the team which is
fielded for a game.
74 Players are induced to put forth effort in training when competing
against their teammates. The winner at each position - chosen subjectively by the coach
- is allowed to participate in the game and receives a bonus. During the game this
incentive also triggers effort since playing well in one game increases the chance to play
in the next game, too, while bad performance highly increases the probability of being
substituted.
A similar tournament-style competition takes place for the spots on the roster or for
playing time in teams in the NFL and NBA. When a NFL team opens training camp
there are more players on the team than are allowed to be on the roster at the beginning
of the regular season. For most positions there is a fierce competition to “survive”
successive cuts and to remain on the team, especially as the wages players receive in
their respective outside option are much lower. These tournaments continue during the
season as there is consistent pressure to perform in order to stay on the team. Besides
the option to simply put a player on the bench or to trade a player, clubs in the NFL can
also terminate the contract. Furthermore, it is necessary to play in the game in the first
                                                       
73 See Lazear and Rosen (1981) for a general discussion of advantages and disadvantages of tournaments.
For a formal model of team rank-order tournaments see Scully (1995; pp.44).
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place in order to achieve a statistical benchmark for a bonus. So the opportunity to earn
such bonuses depends on the subjective evaluations of the coaches.
75
Besides these tournaments within the team there are external tournaments, i.e.
competition amongst all players in the labor market for the best contracts.
76 Contracts
are characterized by security, duration, salary, and division
77 of the salary.
78 If a player
shows exceptional performance over a couple of seasons combined with other criteria
he qualifies for a contract which combines a long duration and a high salary. Thus, most
players have incentives to show their talent, abilities, willingness to fight, and co-
operate with teammates.
This incentive is even bigger considering that by showing their skills players greatly
enhance their marketing value. A considerable part of the future income stream does not
come from the payments of the potential employer(s) but from a mechanism outside the
scope of the normal labor market. The value of a player in the market for advertisement
is based on the fact that he represents something (almost) unique and his characteristics
and abilities are well known. Most players in the highest professional leagues are well
known to the public but only when they achieve star status their marketing value
increases notably.
79
Tournament-style incentives have several drawbacks which apply to various extends to
professional German soccer and US sports. Firstly, playing in a game means additional
                                                                                                                                                                  
74 Usually a soccer club has around 30 players, but only 11 to 14 can play in a single game.
75 Therefore, steps in the hierarchy can be described as “making the team” followed by “getting regular
playing time” to “being a starter”. But unlike in other industries there is a clear distinction between
sporting and financial promotion, i.e. moving up the hierarchy is not perfectly correlated with the quality
and type of the player’s contract.
76 See Frick (2001).
77 This includes signing bonuses, fixed and incentive related payments as well as the distribution of the
fixed salary over the years of the contract.
78 Interestingly, there is no trade-off between the different components of a contract in the NBA and in the
NFL (Frick and Prinz, 2000).
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effort and, hence, disutility for the player, so the bonus for participating in a game could
be considered merely a normal payment.
80 Secondly, the coach might use tactics in
which not the best player overall is needed, but a player with a certain quality who
might be inferior to his competitors in several other aspects.
81 Thirdly, tournaments
result in players preferring to compete against weak opponents because the chance of
winning is higher and less effort is needed to win. Fourthly, as players are
heterogeneous with regards to their contract duration they have different motivation
depending on the stage of their career.
82,83 Hence, competition is less fierce than
amongst homogeneous players.
84 The most severe shortcoming is that such tournaments
have harmful effects, because players of the same team compete against each other and
have incentives to boycott or, even worse, injure their own teammates in order to win
the price, i.e. the spot on the team.
85
Having these drawbacks in mind, it is doubtful whether tournaments within a team
automatically induce efficient incentives. The fact that clubs in the NFL and NBA try to
use objective performance measures and tournament-style incentives based on
subjective performance measures supports this impression. Before we will conclude this
chapter, considering the possibility of combining subjective and objective performance
                                                                                                                                                                  
79 See Frank and Cook (1991) on the issue of winner-take-all markets and Rosen (1981) on the economics
of “superstars”. See Frick (2001) for an application of the later theory to labor markets in team sports.
80 This depends on the size of the bonus payment.
81 This also includes using varying numbers of players in defense, offense and midfield.
82 See Frick and Prinz (2000).
83 So players at the beginning of their career have incentives to be on the team because there are effects
on the reputation which then have consequences for the future chances of employment and remuneration.
See Prendergast (2000): “He [the employee] realizes that good performance today is informative of his
talent, which increases his future pay. Thus, in a certain environment, the worker has incentive to exert
effort in the absence of a contract explicitly tying current pay to performance.” Players at the end of their
career have less incentives as these effects on reputation are no longer important and partly because they
can rely on past merits. Based on these assumptions it is easier for young players to beat veterans.
84 Additionally, there is no ultimate sanction a club can impose on a player, especially at the end of his
career. All contracts in soccer are guaranteed, i.e. terminating the contract is not a viable option.
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measures in team sports we return to analyze the problems with objective performance
measures more closely.
4.2  Objective performance measures
Principal-agent theory as described above, focuses on the trade-off between incentives
and insurance. Risk-neutral principals insure risk-avers agents. Thereby the principal
simultaneously reduces the incentives provided. This perspective did not proof to be
very powerful in explaining existing incentive systems as there seems to exist a gap
between theory and practice.
 86 Therefore, part of the discussion in agency theory shifts
the focus from this trade-off to the quality of objective performance measures.
87 In the
following we will revise some of these recent arguments with regards to the contracts in
the NFL, the NBA and professional German soccer. We start by looking at the trade-off
between risk and distortion of objective performance measures (4.2.1). Then we
elaborate on the implications of this trade-off with regards to bonuses paid based on
individual effort in team sports (4.2.2) before turning to the costs of incentive systems
based on objective performance measures (4.2.3).
4.2.1 Objective performance measures: the trade-off between risk and distortion
Traditional agency theory predicts, that since the agent is assumed to be risk-avers, low-
risk performance measures
88 are preferable if payments according to observed effort are
not possible. In the case of team sports low-risk performance measures should be based
                                                                                                                                                                  
85 As injuries are part of team sports it is almost impossible to say whether a tackle was done with the
intention to hurt a player or if the injured player was just unlucky. This is even valid under our
assumption of observability of effort.
86 As described by Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988). As seen above this is also true for the incentive
systems used in sports.
87 See e.g. Baker (1992, 2000a, 2000b)  and Prendergast (2000).
22 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2002,  Paper 17
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2002/iss1/art17version18_11;Erstelldatum 18.11.02 01:32 23
on the output of the individual player, e.g. a soccer player could be paid according to the
number of one-on-one-situations won during a game. This would expose the player to
less risk than being paid according to team output, i.e. the result of the game, as it
makes him less dependent on the other team members and on exogenous variables.
89
But as seen above variable payments – especially in soccer - are usually based on team
output. Why is that? When determining the power of an incentive system not only risk
is playing a crucial role but also the distortion of a performance measure.
90 A
performance measure is highly distorted if it provides incentives to take actions that
although increasing the performance measure (and thereby the agent’s payments) hardly
increase the principal’s target
91 at the same time or are even counterproductive.
92
Usually there is a trade-off between risk and distortion, i.e. the principal has a choice
between higher-risk, lower-distortion and lower-risk, higher-distortion performance
measures.
93 This trade-off is very evident in team sports, as we will show in the next
part.
                                                                                                                                                                  
88 Low-risk performance measures are those that expose the agent to little risk. Those measures are
strongly correlated with the agent’s effort.
89 Baker (2000b) defines the extent to which the agent is able to control or influence the used performance
measure as „controllability“. Here, the controllability of the measurement „one-on-one-situations won“ is
higher than the controllability of the result of the game.
90 See Baker (2000a, 2000b).
91 Baker (1992) claims that in most cases the principal’s target is not contractible since many
organizations lack a clear objective. He argues that “the absence of a well-articulated organizational
objective ‚trickles down‘ through the entire performance measurement system“. In the team sports
industry and especially in European soccer the exact aim of the club, i.e. the principal, is ambiguous (see
e.g. Downward and Dawson (2000), pp.27). In this paper we assume that the aim is profit maximization
of which the sportive success is a proxy.
92 See Kerr (1975) for several examples where the principal rewards A, although he is hoping for B. For
example, if a player is paid according to the number of one-on-one-situations won, he has an incentive to
win one-on-one situations but that might not entirely reflect the interest of the coaches or the
management. In some cases it might be necessary to cover an opposing player instead of attacking the one
having the ball. One example for this is  known as the “Ted Williams” effect who ignored the instructions
of the coach in order to get the hitting record in baseball (We thank G. W. Scully for this example).
93 See Baker (2000a).
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4.2.2  Objective performance measures and cooperation in team sports
As seen in chapter 3 the incentives in German soccer are mainly based on the result of
the game, i.e. the output of the team. Following traditional agency-theory this is
surprising, since paying a player according to the team output exposes him to high risk.
From this perspective the incentive systems based on team output are inefficient. Still,
there might be a good reason for using team output as a performance measure:
Individual rewards, e.g. paying the goal-keeper for the number of saves, a striker based
on the goals scored, and a defender on one-on-one-situations won, might distort
incentives to cooperate within the team. As explained above there is a trade-off between
the distortion and the risk of incentives. Paying a player according to the team output
has the disadvantage of exposing him to high risk, but at the same time it aligns his
interest with the interest of the principal, i.e. winning the game. Depending on how
important and valuable cooperation is, it might be reasonable to pay the agents based on
team output.
94 Especially in soccer cooperation between the players is very important.
95
As a single player is not able to decide the game the team members have to support each
other.
96
The trade-off between distortion and risk also explains why in the NFL there are more
bonus payments based on the individual performance: Obviously cooperation is not as
important in football as in soccer.
97 Therefore, it is easier to align the individual
performance measures of the players with the interest of the club. Even in the NBA,
although the concept of the game seems to be roughly similar to soccer, a single player
                                                       
94 In general, it is also important how well cooperation can be monitored and at which cost (Frick, 2000).
95 Cooperation becomes even more important if the tasks the individuals have to perform are
complementary because the effect of shirking is increasing (Frick, 2000).
96 It is one of the commonplaces in soccer, that it is “always the team that wins games”.
97 The NFL as opposed to soccer has more specialized positions. The effort and abilities of a single player
a more easily separable and more decisive than in soccer. So setting incentives based on individual
performance is easier.
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is more decisive as the tasks in the game are more separated, there are less player, and
the field is much smaller.
4.2.3  The cost of incentive systems based on objective performance measures
Implementing new incentive systems based on unfamiliar performance measures is
always costly.
98  Firstly, there are the costs of implementing an incentive system. This
includes costs of finding a correct mechanism, especially because in team sports a single
performance measure will never be sufficient. Rather the management of a team has to
install a system consisting of several measures. It is very difficult to specify ex ante,
what the players should do.
99 Therefore, it is very difficult to identify a performance
measure, or a combination of several performance measures, without distorting the
incentives for the players. Not only the costs of finding and specifying such a system
would be high but also the transaction costs, emerging from the implementation of such
a system. Such costs include complex bargaining between management and players and
monitoring.
Secondly, costs might emerge as soon as the performance measures are wrongly
specified, i.e. the measure rewards something what was not intended. The players than
have an incentive to optimize the actual measure instead of the intended target.
To summarize, every incentive mechanism causes costs. These costs have to be
compared to the benefits of the incentive mechanism, i.e. the reduction of agency costs.
In team sports it is possible that an incentive system based on individual output might
not be worth its costs.
                                                       
98 See Baker (2000a).
99 Or as Baker, Murphy and Jensen (1988) put it: “The principal knows, in general terms, what he wants
the agent to do, but the range of possible actions that the agent can take, and the range of possible
outcomes, is enormous.“
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4.3  Combination of subjective and objective performance measures
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1993) argue that combining subjective and objective
measures might provide sufficient incentives for individual performance.
As seen above in German soccer as well as in US sports subjective performance
measures are used for tournament-style incentives. But while contracts used in US
sports can be interpreted as a combination of subjective and objective performance
measures, the latter are not used in German soccer at all. The above analyzed explicit
clauses in US sports are based on objective measures, i.e. proxies of individual effort,
which are used to condition bonuses on statistical performance benchmarks.
100 Hence,
incentives based on objective, publicly observable accomplishments and implicit
agreements based on subjective evaluations work complementarily. Together they
might be able to induce optimal performance and off-field behavior by the players.
Taking these points into account it is surprising that incentives in German soccer are
primarily conditioned on subjective assessment by the coach. But as argued before this
difference might be explained by the nature of the sports, i.e. the importance of
cooperation amongst the team members. It is highly likely that it is not possible to find
good objective performance measures for soccer players, especially taking into account
that using these performance measures can be costly.
5.  Conclusion
In this paper we applied a principal-agent perspective on incentive clauses used in team
sports. Comparing the variable payments in US sports to those in German soccer there
are considerable differences. We found, that  there are no explicit incentive clauses
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directly based on individual effort. However, subjective performance measures directly
based on individual effort are implicitly agreed upon to induce tournaments.
Tournaments seem to be an important mean to make players run, score and win.
Since tournaments have considerable drawbacks a combination of tournaments with
objective, explicit clauses in contracts seems to be advisable. We discovered that such a
complementary structure of performance measures is used in the NBA and NFL. Hence,
the incentive systems used in the US seem to represent a good solution.
In German soccer objective individual performance measures for the players’ effort are
not used at all. There is only a combination of tournament-style incentives and clauses
based on team output. Still, it is arguable if agency costs could be reduced by
introducing objective performance measures based on individual effort instead of team
output due to the nature of soccer and the necessity to cooperate. It seems to be a strong
argument, that because of the nature of soccer it is difficult, costly, and maybe not even
desirable to define objective performance measures in addition to the subjective
performance measures already used.
                                                                                                                                                                  
100 According to Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1993) objective criteria should not be perfect because then
the principal has a fallback position which is too attractive.
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